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Hypothesis Testing Minority Game (HMG) is a variant of the standard Minority Game (MG)
that models the inertial behavior of agents in the market. In the earlier study of our group, we find
that agents cooperate better in HMG than in the standard MG when strategies are picked from
the full strategy space. Here we continue to study the behavior of HMG when strategies are chosen
from the maximal reduced strategy space. Surprisingly, we find that, unlike the standard MG, the
level of cooperation in HMG depends strongly on the strategy space used. In addition, a novel
intermittency dynamics is also observed in the minority choice time series in a certain parameter
range in which the orderly phases are characterized by a variety of periodic dynamics. Remarkably,
all these findings can be explained by the crowd-anticrowd theory.
PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh, 89.75.-k, 05.40.-a
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I. INTRODUCTION
Studying economic systems by agents-based models
have attracted the attention among physicists in recent
years [1, 2, 3]. One of the most famous agents-based
model in this regard is the Minority Game (MG) [3, 4].
MG does not only capture the fact that all people in the
market think inductively and selfishly [5], its complex-
ity also satisfy the definition of a complex system in the
strictest sense [6]. In spite of its simple governing rules,
agents in this model self-organize giving rise to an unex-
pected global cooperative phenomena.
Using the standard MG as blue print, various modifi-
cations to the rules of the standard MG have been pro-
posed [7, 8, 9, 10] to understand different aspects and
phenomena in realistic economic systems. In particu-
lar, Man and Chau introduced the Hypothesis Testing
Minority Game (HMG) to model the inertial behavior
of agents [11]. They found that the presence of inertial
agents improve global cooperation leading to a decrease
of the variance per agent over the entire parameter space
provided that the strategies of each agent are chosen from
the so-called full strategy space (FSS) [11, 12].
In this paper, we move on to study the agent coopera-
tion and the dynamics of HMG in case the strategies are
picked from the so-called maximal reduced strategy space
(MRSS) [13]. We begin by briefly reviewing the rules of
HMG and stating the parameters used in our numerical
simulations in Sec. II. Then we report our simulation
results in Sec. III. To our surprise, the behavior of HMG
depends strongly on the strategy spaces used. Specifi-
cally, agents generally cooperate better when strategies
are picked from the FSS rather than the MRSS provided
that they are sufficiently reluctant to change their strate-
gies. In contrast, the standard MG is so robust that its
dynamics and cooperative behavior are essentially the
same irrespective of whether the FSS or the MRSS is
used. Furthermore, we find that in HMG the minority
choice time series exhibits intermittency in which the or-
derly phases show periodic dynamics with period up to
2(2M − 1) whenever the memory size of the strategies
M is greater than 1 in a certain parameter range when
strategies are picked from the MRSS. This novel inter-
mittent phenomenon does not show up in HMG provided
that strategies are picked from the FSS as well as in the
standard MG. We explain how these differences originate
from the choice of the strategy space by a semi-analytical
approach known as the crowd-anticrowd theory [14, 15]
in Sec. IV. In fact, the major reason responsible for these
differences is that it is a lot easier for an agent to keep on
using one’s currently adopted strategy when the strategy
pool is the MRSS than rather than FSS in certain pa-
rameter regime. Finally, we summarize our findings in
Sec. V. Our findings show that extra care is needed to
study variants of MG as their behavior may depend sen-
sitively on the strategy space employed. Nonetheless, the
ability to explain the behavior of HMG using the crowd-
anticrowd theory suggests that this theory may still be
useful to explain the dynamics of variants of the standard
MG provided that one carries out the analysis carefully.
II. HYPOTHESIS TESTING MINORITY GAME
Recall that in the standard MG, agents act according
to the predictions of their best performing strategies. In
other words, agents in the standard MG do not hesitate
to stop using their current strategies once the perfor-
mance indicator, known as virtual score, shows that the
strategies are not the best. In contrast, the HMG incor-
porated the inertial behavior of agents by allowing them
to stick to their currently using strategies until their per-
formances are too poor to be acceptable. More precisely,
a fixed real number Ik between 0.5 and 1.0 is assigned
once and for all to each agent k in HMG to represent
their reluctance to switch strategies. Using the value of
2Ik as an indicator of the confidence level, agent k tests
the hypothesis that his currently using strategy is his best
strategy at hand at each turn. Furthermore, he switches
to another strategy and resets the virtual scores of all his
strategies to 0 if the null hypothesis is rejected. Apart
from these differences, the governing rules of HMG are
identical to those of the standard MG.
We state the rules of HMG below for reader’s conve-
nience.
A. Rules of the game
1. HMG is a repeated game of a fixed population of
N agents. A number Ik ∈ [0.5, 1) is assigned to
agent k once and for all to represent his inertia.
2. At each turn τ , every agent has to make a choice
between one of the two sides (namely side 0 and
side 1) based on the strategies to be described in
rule 4. Those agents in the side with the least num-
ber of agents (known as the minority side) win in
that turn. And in case of a tie, the winning side is
randomly selected.
3. The only piece of global information reveals to the
agents at time τ is the winning sides in the last M
turns known as the history ~µ(τ).
4. Before the game commences, each agent k is as-
signed once and for all S randomly picked strate-
gies Sk,i for i = 0, 1, . . . , S − 1. Each strategy Sk,i
is a function map from the set of all possible histo-
ries to the set {0, 1} and its virtual score Ωk,i is set
to 0 initially. Without loss of generality, strategy
Sk,0 is assumed to be the currently using strategy
of agent k at the beginning of game.
5. Agent k will switch his current strategy from Sk,0
to Sk,j if and only if the maximum virtual score
difference ∆Ωk drops below the threshold xk
√
2τk,
that is,
∆Ωk ≡ max
i
{Ωk,0 − Ωk,i} = Ωk,0 − Ωk,j
≤ xk
√
2τk (1)
where xk is defined by
1√
2π
∫ +∞
xk
e−x
2/2 dx = Ik (2)
and τk is the number of turns elapsed since agent k’s
last switch of strategy. In case agent k switches his
strategy, he exchanges the labels 0 and j so that his
currently using strategy is always labeled as Sk,0.
In addition, the virtual scores Ωk,i are reset to 0
for all i and τk is reset to 1.
6. Agent k uses his current strategy to guess the mi-
nority choice of the current turn. Moreover, the vir-
tual score of strategy Sk,i is increased (decreased)
by 1 if it predicts the minority side of that turn
correctly (incorrectly).
B. Parameters used in our simulation
We select the following parameters in our simulations:
1. N is odd;
2. S = 2;
3. all values of Ik are chosen to be the same indepen-
dent of the agent label k (and we write this common
Ik as I for simplicity); and
4. Sk,j are picked from the so-calledMRSS [13]. (That
is, Sk,j can be written in the form
sτ = η0 +
M∑
i=1
ηiµτ−i , (3)
where sτ is the prediction of the minority side in the
τth turn, η0, η1, . . . , ηM ∈ {0, 1}, µi is the minority
side in the ith turn and the arithmetic is performed
in the finite field of two elements GF (2) [8, 13,
16]. In other words, a strategy in the MRSS is
characterized by (η0, η1, . . . , ηM ).)
With the exception of point 4, the parameters used in
this study are identical to those used in our earlier study
of HMG reported in Refs. [11, 12]. In contrast, strategies
in Refs. [11, 12] are picked from the FSS, namely, the
set of all possible strategies. And a strategy in the FSS
may not be expressed as a linear function of µi’s. From
now on, we use the symbols HMGFSS and HMGMRSS to
denote the HMG in which strategies are picked from the
FSS and the MRSS, respectively.
III. OUR NUMERICAL SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Focus of our study
We are interested in both the cooperative behaviors
and the dynamics of the game. Recall that MG and
HMG are non-positive sum games in the sense that the
number of winning agents is less than or equal to the
number of losing agents in each turn. And we say that
the agents (or the system) cooperate better if the av-
erage number of winning agents per turn is high. Our
numerical simulations show that agents self-organize in
such a way that there is no bias in picking the minority
side when averaged over the agents and the number of
turns, so we follow the usual practice to study agent co-
operation by means of the α ≡ 2M+1/NS against σ2/N
3graph where σ2 is the variance of the number of agents
choosing side 0 [13]. The lower the value of σ2/N , the
better the agent cooperation.
As for the dynamics of HMG, our investigation focuses
on the analysis of the periodicity of the minority choice
time series through the auto-correlation function. And
the auto-correlation function can be conveniently stud-
ied by means of a time lag t against auto-correlation C0
graph. In order to make sure that the dynamics is gen-
uine and long lasting, we only consider the time series
after the system has equilibrated. We also perform sim-
ulations using different values of N and initial quenched
disorders to make sure that the dynamics we are going
to report below are generic.
Actually, the dynamics depends on the following three
factors:
1. number of agents N ;
2. history size M ; and
3. the initial quenched disorder as reflected by the
value I and the strategies Sk,i assigned to the
agents.
Our choice of parameters for the HMGMRSS reported in
Sec. II B makes the dynamics of the game deterministic
and hence enabling us to study the periodic dynamics
of the minority choice time series easily. In contrast,
when played using other choices of N and S, the non-
deterministic nature of this game weakens the periodic
dynamics in minority choice time series, making both
the numerical and analytical studies more troublesome.
Unlike the standard MG, we find that both the co-
operative behavior and the dynamics of HMG depend
strongly on the strategy space chosen. We shall elabo-
rate more on this point in the coming two subsections.
α
-310 -210 -110 1
/N2
σ
-410
-310
-210
-110
1
10
I=0.53
I=0.90
M=5, FSS
FIG. 1: The α against σ2/N graph for HMGFSS. The value
of α is varied by fixing M and changing N .
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FIG. 2: The auto-correlation for HMGFSS with α = 6.4 ×
10−4 ≪ αMGc when (a) I = 0.53 and (b) I = 0.90.
B. Reviewing the simulation results of the
HMGFSS
Recall from the earlier study of our group in Refs. [11,
12] that when I is chosen to be less than Ic1 , where
Ic1 =
1√
2π
∫ +∞
−
√
2/2M+1
e−x
2/2 dx , (4)
the inertia of agents is not strong enough to make the dy-
namics of the HMGFSS to deviate significantly from that
of the standard MG. Thus, the σ2/N is about the same
as that of the standard MG. Moreover, the well-known
period 2M+1 dynamics in the minority choice time series
that appears in the standard MG when α is less than
αMGc ≈ 0.3, the critical value for the standard MG, is
also present here [11, 12]. In contrast, when I > Ic1 , the
inertia of agents becomes strong enough to significantly
reduce the herd effect amongst agents resulting in a much
lower σ2/N (and hence indicating that agents cooperate
better). Besides, the period 2M+1 dynamics is no longer
present when α < αMGc [11, 12]. These earlier findings
are summarized in Figs. 1 and 2.
C. Simulation results of the HMGMRSS
Contrary to our expectation, we find that the behav-
ior of HMGMRSS is significantly different from that of
4HMGFSS when I >∼ Ic1 and α <∼ 1. The details of our
findings are listed below.
• I <∼ Ic1 : By comparing Fig. 1 with Fig. 3a and
Fig. 2 with Figs. 4 and 5, we know that the behavior
of HMGMRSS in this regime is similar to that of
HMGFSS. That is, they have about the same level
of agent cooperation. In addition, the standard MG
[17, 18, 19], HMGFSS [11] and HMGMRSS all exhibit
the same period 2M+1 dynamics in the minority
choice time series whenever α <∼ αMGc and show no
periodic dynamics for α >∼ αMGc .
• I >∼ Ic1 and α ≥ 1(≫ αMGc ): By comparing Fig. 1
with Fig. 3, we find that the values of σ2/N are
about the same for both HMGFSS and HMGMRSS
in this regime. Moreover, the standard MG [13],
HMGFSS [11] and HMGMRSS all show no periodic
dynamics.
• I >∼ Ic1 and α <∼ 0.1(≪ αMGc ): Figs. 1 and 3 show
that for the same value of α in this regime, the
cooperation amongst agents for the standard MG
is the worst, for HMGMRSS is in the middle and
for HMGFSS is the best. One interesting feature
for HMGMRSS is that, unlike HMGFSS, the value
of σ2/N increases as α decreases in this regime in-
dicating that agents cooperate less and less as the
number of agents N increases (and with M and S
held fixed). As for the dynamics, Fig. 6 depicts that
the system exhibits no obvious periodic dynamics.
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FIG. 3: Plots of α against σ2/N for HMGMRSS with (a) I =
0.53, 0.90 and (b) I = 0.95.
Nonetheless, its minority choice time series condi-
tioned on an arbitrary but fixed history exhibits a
very weak period two dynamics.
• I >∼ Ic1 and 0.1 <∼ α ≈ αMGc < 1: In this regime,
we find that the value of σ2/N obtained after equi-
libration depends on the initial quenched disorder
of the system indicating the presence of a phase
transition point. (See Fig. 3.) Actually, the val-
ues of σ2/N obtained in many runs are rather close
to the theoretical minimum of 1/4N (which is at-
tained when there are exactly (N − 1)/2 winning
agents in each turn) implying that agents cooperate
almost perfectly.
The dynamics of the minority choice time series in
this regime is rather complex. Actually, no obvi-
ous periodic dynamics is observed for those initial
quenched disorder that ends up with values of σ2/N
about the same as those for I < Ic1 . (See Fig. 7a.)
In contrast, those ending up with a much smaller
σ2/N show intermittency. (See Fig. 7b.) That is
to say, when σ2/N is small, the time series exhibits
periodic dynamics for some time and then the pe-
riodicity either suddenly disappears or the period
of the dynamics changes. Also the brief episode
of aperiodicity terminates with the commencement
of a new periodic dynamics (with possibly a new
period).
Interestingly, the period of the orderly phase for
this intermittency depends on the value of I. In
case Ic1 <∼ I < Ic2 , where
Ic2 ≡ 1√
2π
∫ +∞
−
√
2
e−x
2/2 dx ≈ 0.92135 , (5)
the periods are less than or equal to 2(2M−1) when-
everM ≥ 2. More importantly, these periods are in
the form 2jL.C.M.(p1, p2, . . . , pM ) where j ≥ 1 is an
integer, L.C.M. denotes the least common multiple
of the M arguments and p1, . . . , pM are positive in-
tegers dividing (2M −1). Clearly, this phenomenon
is novel and is never found in both the standard MG
and HMGFSS. We observe the trend that long pe-
riod dynamics tends to be more stable in the sense
that it lasts longer. In fact, the longest periodic
dynamics, namely the one with period 2(2M − 1),
appears to be the most stable. However, being the
most stable dynamics does not necessarily mean
that it must show up for every initial quenched dis-
order. Actually, the period 2(2M − 1) dynamics is
harder and harder to find as M increases beyond
about 7.
In the case of I ≥ Ic2 , the periodic dynamics of
the orderly phase of the intermittency is weak com-
pared with the case of Ic1 <∼ I < Ic2 . As shown
in Fig. 7c, the maximum period is in the form
2j(2M − 1) where j is an integer greater than or
equal to 2.
5Our findings of the dynamics of the minority choice
time series can be tabulated in Table I.
Period of MG HMGFSS HMGMRSS
dynamics I < Ic1 I > Ic1 I ≪ Ic1 I >∼ I
c1
α≫ αMGc nil nil nil nil nil
α ≈ αMGc 2
M+1 2M+1 nil 2M+1 intermittenta
α≪ αMGc 2
M+1 2M+1 nil 2M+1 nilb
aThe maximum period of the orderly phase of this dynamics is
2j(2M − 1) where the value of j can be found in the main text.
bBut the minority choice time series conditioned on an arbitrary
but fixed history shows a very weak period two dynamics
TABLE I: Summary of the dynamics in the minority choice
time series for MG and HMG for odd number of agents and
M ≥ 2.
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FIG. 4: The auto-correlation of HMGMRSS for α = 0.63 ≫
αMGc when (a) I = 0.53 and (b) I = 0.90.
D. Conditions for the period
2j L.C.M.(p1, p2, . . . , pM ) dynamics in the orderly
phase of the HMGMRSS intermittency
We find that in HMGMRSS, some agents seldom change
their strategies while others do so frequently. We say that
an agent is oscillating if he switches strategy within the
previous 2M+1 turns. Otherwise, the agent is said to be
frozen. It turns out that the number of frozen agents
and their performance provide important information to
allow us to understand the origin of the dynamics in the
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FIG. 5: The auto-correlation of HMGMRSS for I < Ic1 and
α = 6.4 × 10−4 ≪ αMGc .
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FIG. 6: The auto-correlation of HMGMRSS when α = 6.4 ×
10−4 ≪ αMGc together with (a) I
c1 < I < Ic2 and (b) I ≥ Ic2 .
minority choice time series of HMGMRSS for I >∼ Ic1 and
α ≈ αMGc .
Table II shows the average probabilities for a frozen
(an oscillating) agent to correctly predict the minority
side in a typical HMGMRSS with I >∼ Ic1 and α ≈ αMGc .
Clearly, a frozen (an oscillating) agent will have a higher
(lower) chance to correctly predict the minority side (that
is, the winning probability) in the next turn. Since an os-
cillating agent must lose frequently in recent turns, our
finding means that badly performing agents are likely
to perform badly in future. More importantly, numer-
ical simulations tell us that the presence of the period
2j L.C.M.(p1, p2, . . . , pM ) dynamics in the orderly phase
of the intermittency where j ≥ 1 is an integer and
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FIG. 7: The auto-correlation of HMGMRSS for α = 0.064 ≈
αMGc with (a) I
c1 < I < Ic2 and σ2/N is large, (b) Ic1 < I <
Ic2 and σ2/N is small, and (c) I ≥ Ic2 and σ2/N is small.
mean winning probability
N frozen agents oscillating agents
4001 0.499 0.292
8001 0.499 0.302
16001 0.499 0.293
TABLE II: The winning probability of frozen and oscillating
agents forM = 3 and I = 0.90 averaged over 100 independent
runs.
p1, . . . , pM divide (2
M − 1) is almost always accompa-
nied by the presence of only one oscillating agent in the
entire system. Besides, this oscillating agent uses only
two distinct strategies that are anti-correlated. (That is,
these two strategies predict different minority side for
all given histories [14, 15].) Moreover, the strategies
used by the remaining frozen agents form a collection
of crowd-anticrowd pairs. Interestingly, our observed in-
termittency disappears and becomes a single aperiodic
phase if we replace the histories by random variables or
if the number of agents N is even. Also, the sole oscillat-
ing agent associated with each orderly phase of the time
series may be different.
IV. THE CROWD-ANTICROWD
EXPLANATION
Let us briefly review how the crowd-anticrowd theory
explains the behavior of the standard MG before adapt-
ing it to explain the behavior of HMGFSS and HMGMRSS.
A. The crowd-anticrowd theory for the standard
MG
According to the crowd-anticrowd theory, agent coop-
eration in the standard MG is determined by the number
of (effective) anti-correlated pairs of strategies in current
use. The smaller the difference between the number of
agents currently adopting a strategy a and those cur-
rently adopting its anti-correlated strategy a¯, the bet-
ter the crowd-anticrowd cancellation leading to a bet-
ter agent cooperation. Since the number of available
strategies is much less than the strategy space size for
α≫ αMGc , crowd-anticrowd cancellation cannot be effec-
tive in this regime. And because standard MG agents do
not have inertia, they switch strategies immediately once
the maximum virtual score difference is negative. Due to
the fact that the virtual score of a strategy in the stan-
dard MG is independent of who owns or uses it, every
standard MG agent has the same view on the perfor-
mance of a given strategy. So, when α≪ αMGc , standard
MG agents tend to adopt and drop similar strategies all
the time. This over-reaction leads to a herd effect and is
the origin of the maladaptation in the standard MG in
this regime. Thus, effective agent cooperation is possible
only for α ≈ αMGc in the standard MG. A remarkable
feature of the standard MG is that effective agent coop-
eration is indeed possible in this regime in spite of the
fact that agents act independently by utilizing common
global coarse-grained information only [14, 15].
B. Towards the crowd-anticrowd theory for HMG
Unlike the standard MG, HMG agents use Eq. (1)
to decide whether to keep their currently using strate-
gies or not. In general, they are initially assigned dif-
ferent strategies and begin to adopt their currently us-
ing strategies at different times. So, they have different
virtual score difference ∆Ωk and the number of turns
since the adoption of the current strategy τk. Together
with the virtual score reset mechanism stated in rule 4
of HMG, the same strategy may be ranked differently
7amongst HMG agents. Consequently, by picking strate-
gies from the same strategy space, the effective strategy
diversity for HMG is in general bigger than that for the
standard MG. Furthermore, the higher the value of I
(and hence the higher the inertia), the slower the average
rate of strategy switching. All these factors reduce HMG
agents’ over-reaction and the herd effect making the sys-
tem to better cooperate [11, 12]. Just like the standard
MG, the dynamics of HMG encourages agents to form
crowd-anticrowd pairs thereby increasing agent coopera-
tion. But unlike the standard MG, this “crowd-anticrowd
pair formation” driving force in HMG is more gentle and
is less likely to cause over-reaction and maladaptation
because of the presence of inertia. Hence, the higher the
inertia, the longer the equilibration time. At this point,
we have to emphasize that the presence of inertia need
not imply that the agents must cooperate because the
“crowd-anticrowd pair formation” driving force may not
be strong enough in a certain parameter regime. The
bottom line is that the presence of inertia never worsen
the agent cooperation. In other words, for fixed values of
M , N and S, the variance of attendance per agent σ2/N
for the standard MG has to be greater than or equal to
that for the HMGFSS or HMGMRSS.
Suppose the agents really cooperate. Still there are two
ways to prevent them from cooperating forever. Con-
sider a history ~µ which has non-zero probability of oc-
currence. Suppose further that the minority choice time
series conditioned on this history ~µ is biased. (That is, it
is more likely to find a particular minority choice than the
other in this conditioned time series.) In this case, cer-
tain strategy a will outperform its anti-correlated partner
a¯ in the long run. More precisely, the rate of change of
virtual score difference between a and a¯ averaged over a
sufficiently long number of turns is positive. So, after a
sufficiently long time, agents will begin to drop strategy
a¯ and adopt strategy a, making strategy a¯ much more
popular than strategy a. In particular, if the minority
choice time series exhibits periodic dynamics, then the
timescale for a frozen agent to change to an oscillating
agent via this mechanism is directly proportional to the
period of the dynamics and inversely proportional to the
number of biased histories in the minority choice time
series.
Even if the minority choice time series conditioned on
every history is un-biased, there is still a way for agents
to stop cooperating. Provided that the value of ∆Ωk
follows an un-biased random walk, after sufficiently long
time, agent k can switch his strategy once a while due
to fluctuations in ∆Ωk. These two mechanisms act like
a “crowd-anticrowd pair destruction” driving force that
decreases agent cooperation. Surely, the former mecha-
nism is more efficient.
In summary, it is the combined actions of the above
two driving forces that determine the agent cooperation
and dynamics of HMG. In fact, the “crowd-anticrowd
pair formation” driving force dominates the initial dy-
namics of the HMG. And the “crowd-anticrowd pair de-
struction” driving force becomes important after most of
the agents have been paired up. This picture allows us
to understand the simulation results reported in Sec. III.
C. The crowd-anticrowd explanation for
HMGMRSS
In the case of α ≫ αMGc , there are so few strate-
gies at play that most of the crowd-anticrowd pairs is
made up of only one agent. As a result, the “crowd-
anticrowd pair formation” driving force is never strong
enough to ensure agent cooperation irrespective of the
value of I. Thus, crowd-anticrowd cancellation is ineffec-
tive. Besides, agents in effect make random choices each
turn so that the value of σ2/N approaches the coin-toss
limit as α → ∞. Surely, the minority choice time se-
ries does not show any periodic dynamics [14, 15]. Since
the above arguments are also valid for the standard MG
and HMGFSS, we understand why MG, HMGFSS and
HMGMRSS all behave in the same way in this parameter
regime.
In the case of I <∼ Ic1 , the inertia of agents is so low
that agents switch strategies immediately whenever the
maximum virtual score difference is negative. In other
words, the response of standard MG and HMG agents are
the same in this parameter regime [11]. Hence, the agent
cooperation and dynamics of standard MG, HMGFSS and
HMGMRSS are about the same.
The remaining case to study is I >∼ Ic1 and α <∼ αMGc .
Note that the behavior of HMGFSS and HMGMRSS in this
case differ markedly as reported in Sec. III. We begin our
analysis by stating the following claim whose proof can
be found in Appendix A.
Claim 1 Let N be an even number. Suppose each of the
N players are randomly and independently assigned S
socks; and a sock has 2M possible colors and can either
be left or right. (Hence, there are 2M+1 kinds of socks.)
Suppose further that each kind of sock is selected with
equal probability. Then, provided that 2M+1 < NS, the
probability that there exists a way to form N/2 pairs of
socks by picking exactly one sock from each of the N play-
ers is greater than or equal to 1− β/N for some positive
β which is independent of N .
Recall that two strategies are said to be anti-correlated
if they always predict different minority side. And they
are said to be uncorrelated if they have equal chance to
predict the same minority side provided that each history
occurs with equal probability. Thus, strategies in the
MRSS consist of 2M pairs of anti-correlated strategies
and that strategies picked from two distinct pairs are
uncorrelated [14, 15].
By identifying the 2M+1 different kinds of socks with
the 2M+1 different strategies in the MRSS, Claim 1 im-
plies that for a sufficiently large N and for α < 1,
the probability of forming ⌊N/2⌋ pairs of anti-correlated
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egy pool is high. Surely, finding this solution requires
communications amongst the agents. If the agents could
keep on using his particular choice of strategy throughout
the game, maximum agent cooperation would be attained
and hence the theoretical minimum value of σ2/N (that
is σ2/N = 0 if N is even and 1/4N if N is odd) would be
resulted. In contrast, since the strategy space size of the
FSS is exponentially larger than that of the MRSS in the
large M limit, the condition α < 1 is not sufficient for
agents to maximally cooperate in the above way should
they pick strategies from the FSS. The correct condition
in this case should be 22
M
< NS (and hence, α→ 0+ in
the thermodynamic limit).
Claim 1 only assures the existence of an optimal way
of agent cooperation with a high probability. It remains
to show that this maximum agent cooperation can be
achieved with a high chance for HMGMRSS under certain
conditions. Recall from step 5 of the rules of HMG that
agent k uses the maximum virtual score difference ∆Ωk
amongst all the strategies initially assigned to him to
decide whether to change strategy or not. The following
consequences of step 5 are important to understand the
strong dependence of HMG on the strategy space used:
1. The higher the value of Ik, the more willingly for
agent k to stick to his currently using strategy.
2. For fixed values of Ik’s, agents with a strategy and
its anti-correlated partner in their pool of strategies
have the strongest tendency, on average, to switch
their strategies.
3. Suppose agent k has just switched to a new strat-
egy and that this newly adopted strategy incor-
rectly predicts the minority side in its first use, then
τk = 1 and ∆Ωk = −2. As a result, this agent will
drop his newly adopted strategy in the next turn
provided that Ik < I
c2 .
1. The sub-case of I >∼ I
c1 and α ≈ αMGc
Shortly after the commencement of HMGMRSS, the mi-
nority choice time series should resemble an un-biased
random sequence. So provided that I is sufficiently large,
Subsec. IVB tells us that the “crowd-anticrowd pair for-
mation” driving force allows a large number of agents
to form crowd-anticrowd pairs. Most of these paired
agents will be frozen, and there are only a few oscillat-
ing agents in the system. By simple probability consid-
eration, we expect that most of the strategies hold by
these oscillating agents are un-correlated. As the dy-
namics of the system, which is determined mostly by the
dynamics of these oscillating agents, the minority choice
time series conditioned on an arbitrary history is likely to
be un-biased. Hence, fewer and fewer oscillating agents
will present as they gradually form crowd-anticrowd pair
and become frozen. From Claim 1, we believe that for
a sufficiently large I, agents in HMGMRSS have a high
chance to attain maximum agent cooperation provided
that α ≈ αMGc < 1. This is consistent with the findings
in our numerical simulations reported earlier in Sec. III
that the highest chance of finding maximum agent co-
operation is when α ≈ αMGc and I >∼ Ic1 . And this
maximum agent cooperation is accompanied by the ex-
istence of at most one oscillating agent in the system
who switches between a pair of anti-correlated strategies.
This finding agrees with the discussion following Claim 1
that the agent holding a pair of anti-correlated strategies
switches his strategy most readily. To conclude, when
N is odd, the effective number of strategies at play for
HMGMRSS in this regime is reduced to one in most of
the time. Thus, the frozen agents have an average of 1/2
chance to correctly predict the minority side in the next
turn while the only oscillating agent has no chance to do
so. Consequently, the frozen agents are unlikely to switch
their currently using strategies while the only oscillating
agent is prone to strategy switching.
We now discuss the dynamics of the minority choice
time series when N is odd. From the above discussions,
it is clear that the system is in an orderly (chaotic) phase
whenever it has one (more than one) oscillating agent. In
addition, this oscillating agent is most likely to be switch-
ing between a pair of anti-correlated strategies. This os-
cillating agent always predicts the minority side incor-
rectly throughout the corresponding orderly periodic dy-
namics phase. Thus, from the discussions immediately
after Claim 1, we conclude that this oscillating agent
must drop his currently using strategy and switch to its
anti-correlated counterpart in each turn provided that
Ic1 <∼ I < Ic2 . By identifying a strategy with a linear
function of the historical minority choices µi’s over the fi-
nite field GF (2) in the form of Eq. (3), we know that the
difference between the linear functions associated with
two anti-correlated strategies is equal to 1. So, whenever
α ≈ αMGc and Ic1 <∼ I < Ic2 , the minority side in the nth
turn µn throughout this orderly periodic dynamics phase
obeys
µn =
M∑
i=1
ηiµn−i + η0 + n , (6)
where ηi, µi ∈ GF (2) and n denotes 1 + 1 + · · · +
1 (n terms).
We show in Appendix B the following theorem.
Theorem 1 The sequence {µn} generated by the recur-
sion relation in Eq. (6) is periodic. Its period is in
the form 2jL.C.M.(p1, p2, . . . , pM ) where j ≥ 1, and
p1, . . . , pM are positive integers dividing (2
M −1). More-
over, the longest possible period for this sequence is
2(2M − 1) if M ≥ 2 and 4 if M = 1. Suppose the
sequence is of maximum possible period and M ≥ 2.
Denote the history (µn−M+1, µn−M+2, . . . , µn−1, µn) by
~µ(n). Then, the two histories of alternating 0’s and 1’s,
namely, (0, 1, 0, 1, . . .) and (1, 0, 1, 0, . . .) appear in the se-
quence of history H = {~µ(n)}2(2M−1)n=1 once; while all the
9other (2M − 2) possible histories all appear in the history
sequence H twice.
This theorem allows us to explain the period of the or-
derly phase of the time series in the case of Ic1 <∼ I < Ic2
and α ≈ αMGc . In particular, the proof tells us that
the longest periodic dynamics in the orderly phase for
M ≥ 2 is of period 2(2M − 1). Nevertheless, periods sat-
isfying Theorem 1 do not show up in the orderly phases
equally frequently. If the number of turns between two
consecutive occurrence of a history in an orderly phase
is odd, then the minority time series conditioned on this
history shows period two dynamics because the sole oscil-
lating agent makes alternating prediction of the minority
side each time when he is given the same history. In
other words, the minority choice time series conditioned
on this history is un-biased. In contrast, if the number
of turns between two consecutive occurrence of a history
in an orderly phase is even, the minority time series con-
ditioned on this history is biased for it exhibits period
one dynamics. Thus, the “crowd-anticrowd destruction”
driving force discussed in Subsec. IVB will break the
maximum agent cooperation in a time proportional to
the period of this orderly phase and inversely propor-
tional to the number of conditional minority choice time
series that exhibits period one dynamics.
Theorem 1 tells us that forM ≥ 2, the longest possible
period of the orderly phase is 2(2M − 1). This dynamics
is present when the (degreeM) characteristic polynomial
of the recursion relation (6), which is associated with the
pair of anti-correlated strategies used by the sole oscil-
lating agent, is primitive. In a single period, the two
histories that consists of alternating 0’s and 1’s appear
once while all other histories appear twice. Therefore,
the number of turns between two consecutive appear-
ance of each of the two histories consisting of alternating
0’s and 1’s equal the even number 2(2M − 1). It is easy
to show that the number of turns between two consecu-
tive appearance of all other histories must be odd. (One
way to do so is that if ~µ(k) = ~µ(k′) with (k − k′) being
a positive even number, the homogeneous parts of the
solutions of Eq. (6) for n = k − i and n = k′ − i are
equal whenever i = 0, 1, . . . ,M − 1. And this is possi-
ble only when (2M − 1) | (k − k′). As (k − k′) is even,
so k − k′ ≥ 2(2M − 1). Since all other histories occurs
twice in a single period, the number of turns between
two consecutive occurrence for them must be odd.) In
conclusion, the 2(2M − 1) period dynamics can be found
in the minority choice time series although it cannot be
ever-lasting. Since out of the 2M possible minority choice
time series conditional on a particular history, only two
of them show period one rather than period two dynam-
ics, the period 2(2M−1) dynamics in the minority choice
time series is quite stable in the sense that it lasts for a
longer time. This also explains why the stability of this
period increases with M .
As M increases while keeping S and α fixed, the prob-
ability of having an agent in the system that holds a
pair of anti-correlated strategy is about 1 − [1 − S(S +
1)/2M+2]N → 1 − e−(S+1)/2α. As α ≈ αMGc ≈ 0.3 in
the intermittent phase, it is not surprising that there is a
high chance for the sole oscillating agent in this phase to
switch between two anti-correlated strategies. Nonethe-
less, from the proof of Theorem 1, the corresponding
probability of having an agent in the system that holds
a pair of anti-correlated strategy that causes the period
2(2M − 1) dynamics is about 1 − [1 − S(S + 1)ϕ(2M −
1)/22(M+1)M ]N , where ϕ denotes the Euler-Totient func-
tion. By prime number theorem, this probability is equal
to at least 1− [1− S(S +1)(2M − 1)/22(M+1)M c+1]N →
1−e−(S+1)/2αMc+1 asM →∞, where c is a positive con-
stant. This explains why as M increases, there is general
trend that the period 2(2M − 1) dynamics orderly phase
occurs less frequently.
From Theorem 1, the second longest period in the or-
derly phase is of period 4(2M−1 − 1) for M ≥ 2. This
dynamics is associated with a characteristic polynomial
in the form (λ − 1)p(x) where p(x) is a primitive poly-
nomial of degree (M − 1). Again, using the idea in the
proof of Theorem 1, it is easy to check that the period
4(2M−1 − 1) orderly phase is quite stable (although it is
not as stable as the period 2(2M − 1) dynamics) as all
but four conditional minority choice time series exhibit
period one rather than period two dynamics.
For those orderly phases with shorter periods, the num-
ber of distinct histories present is small so that the effec-
tive diversity of the strategies at play are greatly reduced.
Combined with the presence of, in general, a larger pro-
portion of period one conditional minority choice time
series in this dynamics, these shorter period dynamics
are much less stable in the sense that they can last for a
much shorter time.
The same analysis can be applied to the case when I ≥
Ic2 . In this case, the only oscillating agent in the system
switches his strategy once every few turns. Applying the
same analysis as in the proof of Theorem 1, it can be
shown that the maximum period of the orderly phase
is 2j(2M − 1) where j is the number of turns between
the adoption and termination of a strategy for the sole
oscillating agent. In this situation, the strength of a lot of
period two dynamics in the conditional minority choice
time series are weakened making the dynamics in the
orderly phase less pronounced.
Note that one of the factors making the above inter-
mittent behavior possible is that the number of agents
N is odd. In case N is even, there are equal number of
agents choosing each side. Hence, all agents are frozen
and have 1/2 chance of correctly predicting the minority
side. And the minority choice time series does not show
any periodicity. This is exactly what we observe in our
simulation.
Let us discuss more about the agent cooperation. Even
for α ≈ αMGc and I sufficiently large, the average value of
σ2/N is still a little bit higher than the theoretical min-
imum due to three reasons. First, a few initial quenched
disorders does not allow maximum agent cooperation.
Second, the system may be trapped in a non-maximally
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cooperative state even though the initial quenched dis-
order allows maximum agent cooperation. Third, as we
have pointed out in Subsec. IVB, the aperiodic phase
of the intermittency is associated with the sub-maximal
agent cooperation making the value of σ2/N averaged
over initial quenched disorder greater than the minimum
value. So, it is not surprising to find that the values of
σ2/N for HMGMRSS and HMGFSS are about the same
for α ≈ αMGc and I >∼ Ic1 .
2. The sub-case of I >∼ I
c1 and α≪ αMGc
For fixed M and S, the number of agents N increases
as α decreases. From the discussions in Subsec. IVB, we
know for a sufficiently large N , the timescale for all ex-
cept at most one of the agents to form crowd-anticrowd
pairs is longer than the timescale for a pair of crowd-
anticrowd agents to break up. Therefore, as α ≪ αMGc ,
it is highly unlikely for the system to attain maximum
agent cooperation. Besides, by further increasing α, over-
crowding of strategies is severe as more and more agents
are using the same strategy with similar virtual scores
and number of turns since its adoption. As a result, mal-
adaptation and herd effect begin to appear. These are
the reasons why for I >∼ Ic1 , the value of σ2/N starts
to increase as α falls below about 0.1. This is also the
reason why the minority choice time series conditioned
on an arbitrary but fixed history exhibits a very weak
period two dynamics. However this period two dynamics
is much weaker than the one observed in the standard
MG because the presence of inertia makes the agents to
response less readily. As the effective strategy diversity
of HMGFSS is greater than that of HMGMRSS which is
in turn greater than that of the standard MG, the value
of σ2/N for HMGFSS is smaller than that of HMGMRSS
which is in turn smaller than that of the standard MG
provided that I >∼ Ic1 .
Discussions in the previous two sub-cases predict that
by decreasing α below ≈ 22M /NS, the value of σ2/N
for HMGFSS will start to increase due to overcrowding of
strategies. Unfortunately, we are not able to check the
correctness of our prediction because the memory and
run time requirements are too high.
V. DISCUSSIONS
In summary, we have performed extensive numerical
simulations to study the behavior of HMGMRSS. We
found that HMG agents cooperate better provided that
their strategies are picked from the FSS instead of from
the MRSS. This is because the effective diversity of
strategies is higher in the former case. Based on the
crowd-anticrowd theory [14, 15], we understood the ori-
gin of agent cooperation for HMGMRSS in various pa-
rameter ranges by studying the interplay between the
so-called “crowd-anticrowd pair formation” driving force
and the so-called “crowd-anticrowd pair destruction”
driving force. And we found that the difference in the co-
operative and dynamical behavior between HMGFSS and
HMGMRSS is mainly due to the structure of the strategy
space used. In particular, we were able to explain the
novel intermittent behavior of the system and the orderly
phase dynamics of the minority choice time series when
α ≈ αMGc , I >∼ Ic1 , N is odd and σ2/N ≈ 1/4N . Es-
sentially, this novel orderly dynamics in the intermittent
phase is caused by the fact that the game is effectively
reduced to a similar game played by only one agent most
of the time and is accompanied by the maximum possible
agent cooperation. And this reduction is possible in case
the strategy pool is MRSS rather than FSS.
On one hand, HMGMRSS appears to be special in the
sense that it is the only variant of MG we have examined
whose behavior depends sensitively on whether the FSS
or the MRSS is used. On the other hand, the assump-
tion that the behavior of standard MG when played in
FSS or in MRSS is about the same is only a working as-
sumption supported by numerical simulation results and
heuristic arguments [14, 15]. Although this assumption
greatly simplifies the space complexity of numerical sim-
ulations and sometimes even enable us to obtain a few
semi-analytical results, one should bear in mind that this
is only an assumption after all. In this regard, it is in-
structive to study the conditions under which one can
replace FSS by MRSS without significantly affecting the
dynamics and cooperative behavior of a system.
Lastly, we remark that the standard way of using the
number 2M+1 to measure the diversity of strategies is no
longer appropriate for HMG. We believe that by suitably
defining the diversity of strategies (and hence also the
expression for α), the σ2/N against α curves for HMG
played using different choices of strategy spaces can be
made to coincide, at least roughly.
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APPENDIX A: PROOF OF CLAIM 1
Let Γ,Γ′ denote two different partitions of the N play-
ers into N/2 pairs. Let PrΓ denotes the probability that
it is possible for each of the N/2 pairs of agents in the par-
tition Γ to pick a sock of the same color but different side.
Clearly, PrΓ’s are exchangeable. That is, PrΓ = PrΓ′ . In
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fact, for S ≪ 2M+1,
PrΓ ≈
{ (
2M+1
)
!
2S(M+1)(2M+1 − S)!
[
1−
(
1− S
2M+1
)S]}N2
≈ S
N
2MNS
. (A1)
By de Finetti theorem [20] and its generalization by
Diaconis and Freedman [21], as long as 0 < PrΓ < 1 for
any finite N , the probability that there exists a way to
form N/2 pairs of socks by picking one sock from each
player is lower bounded by Pr(∞)− β/N for some β > 0
independent of N , where Pr(∞) denotes the same prob-
ability when N →∞.
So, to prove this claim, it suffices to show that Pr(∞) =
1 whenever 2M+1 < NS and S ≥ 2. Under these two con-
ditions, it is obvious that PrΓ ∈ (0, 1) for any finite N .
So, de Finetti theorem implies that PrΓ’s are condition-
ally independent given the tail σ-field [20]. Thus,
Pr(∞) = lim
N→∞
1−
∏
Γ
(1− PrΓ) = 1 . (A2)
Hence, claim 1 is proved. 
Before leaving this appendix, we point out a common
mistake people makes. The probability that all paired
players have matching socks for an arbitrary but fixed
partition Γ is equal to P(Γ) ≈
[
1− (1− S/2M+1)S]N/2.
Thus, the expected number of partitions satisfying this
“all paired players” condition is P(Γ)×N !/[(N/2)!]2. A
threshold condition for the existence of a partition that
all paired players have matching socks can then be de-
duced by saddle point approximation. The loophole in
this argument is that socks are assigned once and for all
to the players so that the probabilities P(Γ) and P(Γ′)
are not independent.
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
This proof uses a number of finite field concepts and
techniques. Readers who are not familiar may consult
Ref. [22] before moving on. The characteristic equation
of Eq. (6) is
λM −
M∑
i=1
ηiλ
M−i = 0 . (B1)
If the characteristic equation has no degenerate root,
the homogeneous part of the solution of µn in Eq. (6)
is in the form
∑
i giw
n
i where wi are roots of Eq. (B1)
over the extension field GF (2M ) for some gi ∈ GF (2M ).
Clearly, the period of the sequence {∑i giwni }+∞n=0 divides
L.C.M.(|w1|, |w2|, . . . , |wM |), where |wi| denotes the or-
der of wi. And the equality holds if gi’s are all non-zero.
(Remember also that |wi| divides (2M − 1) for all i.)
What if the roots of Eq. (B1) are degenerate? Sup-
pose w1 is a double root of Eq. (B1). Then, w
n
1 and nw
n
1
are the two generators of the homogeneous part of the
solution of Eq. (6). Besides, the period of the sequence
{g1wn1 + g2nwn1 } divides 2|w1| with the equality holds if
g1, g2 6= 0. Similarly, let 2j be the smallest integer greater
than or equal to k. Then, it is straight-forward to check
that 2j|w1| is divisible by the period of the homogeneous
part of the solution of the recursion relation (6) that cor-
responds to a degree k root w1 of the characteristic equa-
tion (B1). Furthermore, the period can attain the value
2j|w1| provided that the coefficients gi’s are non-zero.
Combining the two cases above, we conclude that the
period of the homogeneous solution of Eq. (6) divides
2jL.C.M.(|w1|, |w2|, . . .) where wi’s are the distinct roots
of its characteristic equation and j is a non-negative inte-
ger. The maximum possible period for this homogeneous
solution is (2M − 1); and this is attainable provided that
the coefficient in each term of the homogeneous solution
is non-zero and the characteristic polynomial of Eq. (6)
is any one of the ϕ(2M − 1)/M primitive polynomials of
degree M in the GF (2)[λ], where ϕ is the Euler-Totient
function. Note further that if the minority choice time
series were generated by the homogeneous solution of
Eq. (6) alone, then this time series would not contain M
consecutive 0’s should its period be (2M − 1). Besides,
in one period, all history strings but the one consists of
all 0’s would appear exactly once.
Now, we study the particular solution of Eq. (6). The
first case to consider is when the characteristic polyno-
mial has an odd number of (non-zero) terms. (This in-
cludes the case when the polynomial is irreducible and
M ≥ 2 for otherwise 1 is a root of Eq. (B1).) In this case,
a particular solution of Eq. (6) is µn = η0 + n (mod 2)
if |{i : ηn−2i 6= 0}| is even or µn = η0 + n+ 1 (mod 2) if
|{i : ηn−2i 6= 0}| is odd. In either case, the period of this
particular solution is 2.
The remaining case is when the number of (non-zero)
terms in Eq. (B1) is even. In this case, (λ − 1) must be
a factor of the R.H.S. of Eq. (B1). We write the R.H.S.
of Eq. (B1) as (λ − 1)kp(λ) for some polynomial p(λ)
with p(1) 6= 0. If k = 1, a particular solution is µn =
⌊(n+ 1− η0)/2⌋ (mod 2) which is of period 4. Similarly,
it is easy to check that there is a particular solution of
Eq. (6) whose period divides 2j where 2j is the smallest
integer greater than (k + 1).
By combining the studies of the periods of the homo-
geneous and particular solutions of Eq. (6), we conclude
that the period of the general solution of Eq. (6) is in the
form 2jL.C.M.(|w1|, |w2|, . . .) where wi’s are the distinct
roots of Eq. (B1) and 2j is the smallest integer greater
than (k + 1). Moreover, the maximum possible period
for the solution of the recursion relation (6) is 2(2M − 1)
for M ≥ 2 and 4 for M = 1. In the former case, such
a maximum period is attained only if the characteristic
polynomial of Eq. (6) is primitive. And in the latter case,
it is attained when the characteristic polynomial is λ−1.
Finally, we consider the case when the period of the
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sequence {µn} attains its maximum possible value of
2(2M − 1). In this case, a particular solution of Eq. (6)
corresponds to the histories of alternating 0’s and 1’s.
So, combined with our earlier analysis on the frequency
of histories for the homogeneous part of the solution of
Eq. (6), we conclude that in each period, all but the two
histories of alternating 0’s and 1’s appear twice. Besides,
the two histories of alternating 0’s and 1’s appear once.
This proves the theorem. 
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